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BUSINESS INSOLVENCY AND THE
IRISH DEBT CRISIS
Paul B. Lewis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the volume of material written about the Irish debt cri-
sis and its impact over the past few years, strikingly little has been
written about the ability to save a financially distressed company
under Irish law and whether corporate restructuring could have miti-
gated some of the financial damage to Irish companies, particularly
those in the property and construction industries. There is a reason for
this. The number of filings under the Examinership law – the rough
equivalent of Chapter 11 in the United States – remained small and
relatively constant during both the recent boom and the more immedi-
ate bust periods of the Irish economy. This article examines the Irish
approach to corporate restructuring and questions whether the law
could have been put to good effect over the past couple of years.
While much has changed in Ireland since the advent of the
Irish debt crisis, the Examinership law has remained unchanged. In
fact, in distinct juxtaposition issues with consumer insolvency – where
the European Union demanded reform to the personal bankruptcy
laws of Ireland as a condition to Ireland obtaining bailout money1– no
such demand was made as related to business insolvency by the Euro-
pean Union, nor was there any meaningful internal discussion in Ire-
land about revising the Examinership law. There may be a good
reason why no such changes to Examinership were contemplated. Ex-
aminership is a moderate and seemingly effective method of dealing
with financially distressed businesses. The question then is why the
law hasn’t been applied better.
Irish Examinership came into being under rather unique and
hurried circumstances. Despite its shaky origins, Examinership re-
mains a sensible balance between the two extremes of corporate rescue
regimes in the common law world. On one end of the business bank-
ruptcy approach is the pro-debtor United States Chapter 11, where
creditor considerations generally are subordinated in the reorganiza-
tion process to the more compelling desire of providing maximum res-
* B.A., Northwestern University, J.D., Yale Law School. Professor of Law and
Director, Center for International Law, The John Marshall Law School.
1 Saranna Enraght-Moony & Dudley Solan, New Personal Insolvency Legislation
Intended for Ireland, MAPLES (May 16, 2012), http://www.maplesandcalder.com/
news/article/new-personal-insolvency-legislation-intended-for-ireland-240/.
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cue opportunity to the business debtor. This is in large part to protect
related third parties, such as employees, suppliers, and neighboring
businesses. At the other end of the continuum is the Australian ver-
sion of business restructuring, known as Voluntary Administration,
where debtor considerations are clearly subordinate to ensuring credi-
tor recovery. Examinership strikes a balance between the U.S. and
Australian approaches, empowering both debtors and creditors. It
makes a rational effort to effectively distinguish distressed but viable
firms from those firms that have little prospect of long-term viability.
In this article, I examine the core of Irish insolvency law in
comparison to its common law counterparts and question why, in an
era where insolvency law is frequently employed elsewhere, it has
been put to so little use in Ireland. Part II of the article provides a brief
overview of the much-covered territory both of the Irish debt crisis and
the cultural factors that led to it. Part III describes Examinership law
in Ireland. Part IV places the Irish insolvency approach in context by
comparing it to two radically different models of business rescue –
American Chapter 11 and Australian Voluntary Administration. Part
V addresses the viability of Examinership under the peculiar circum-
stances that existed in Ireland over the past few years and considers
whether it could have been better employed as a tool to deal with the
economic woes the Republic of Ireland has faced.
II. THE IRISH DEBT CRISIS — A PRIMER
The causes and the evolution of the Irish debt crisis have been
well documented.2 A brief primer of significant dates and events here
will suffice. In the middle of 2008, after more than a decade of eco-
nomic growth, signs began to appear that the Irish economy might be
in trouble.3 Government deficits increased,4 many businesses began
experiencing significant financial problems,5 the rate of unemploy-
2 See generally Philip R. Lane, The Irish Crisis, THE EURO AREA AND THE FINAN-
CIAL CRISIS (forthcoming), available at http://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/
pdfs/iiisdp356.pdf.
3 Lenihan Admits ‘Serious Problem’ in Economy, RTE NEWS (June 24, 2008) (Ir.),
available at http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/0624/economy.html.
4 Irish Economy, ECON. & SOC. RES. INST., available at http://www.esri.ie/irish_
economy/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2012); see also End-2008 Exchequer Returns, DEP’T
FIN., available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=5614 (last visited
Feb. 6, 2012).
5 Press Release, Bank of Ir., Latest Bank of Ireland Barometer Indicates Fall in
Entrepreneurial Activity (Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.bankofireland.com/about-boi-
group/press-room/press-releases/item/142/latest-bank-of-ireland-barometer-indi-
cates-fall-in-entrepreneurial-activity/; Company Liquidations in Ireland More
Than Doubled in 2008, FINFACTS IR. (Jan. 5, 2009), http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfi-
nancenews/article_1015605.shtml.
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ment began to rise,6 and the Irish Stock Index began to fall.7 By Sep-
tember of 2008, the Irish government officially announced that the
country was in a recession, thus becoming the first State in the
Eurozone to officially recognize the existence of a recession.8
In response to the deteriorating economic situation, the Irish
government expedited the introduction of its 2009 budget, introducing
it in early October 2008 rather than during the more traditional De-
cember period.9 Also, in September of 2008, recognizing the tremen-
dous vulnerability of Irish banks, the Irish government announced a
two-year blanket guarantee of the liabilities of Irish-controlled
banks.10
In January of 2009, the Irish government announced plans to
nationalize the Anglo Irish Bank, the country’s third largest lender.11
By February 2009, unemployment in Ireland had reached 11% – the
highest it had been since 1996.12 Protests began to arise in opposition
to the government’s handling of the economic situation.13 In response,
the Irish government announced that it would inject 7 billion euros
6 Int’l Monetary Fund [IMF], Ireland: Extended Arrangement – Interim Review
Under the Emergency Financing Mechanism, at 5, 9, IMF Country Report No. 11/
47 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1147.
pdf; CENT. STATISTICS OFFICE IR., SEASONALLY ADJUSTED STANDARDISED UNEM-
PLOYMENT RATES (SUR), available at http://www.cso.ie/en/statistics/labourmarket/
principalstatistics/seasonallyadjustedstandardisedunemploymentratessur/.
7 ISEQ Falls to 14-Year Low, RTE NEWS (Feb. 24, 2009) (Ir.), available at http://
www.rte.ie/news/2009/0224/markets.html; see also Ireland Stock Market, TRADING
ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ireland/stock-market (last visited Sept.
25, 2012).
8 ECON. & FIN. COMM. (ECOFIN), FINANCIAL CRISIS IN IRELAND 1, available at
http://www.romun.org/semmuna/Background/ECOFIN11%20Ireland.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 6, 2012).
9 See Government Statement, Dep’t of the Taoiseach (Sept. 8, 2008), available at
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/News/Archives/2008/Government_Press_Releases
_2008/Government_Statement1.html.
10 Patrick Honohan, Resolving Ireland’s Banking Crisis, 40 ECON. & SOC. REV.
207, 207 (Summer 2009), available at http://www.esr.ie/Vol40_2/Vol-40-2-
Honohan.pdf; The Economic Adjustment Programme for Ireland, at 12, EUR.
COMM’N (Feb. 2011), Occasional Papers 76, available at http://ec.europa.eu/econ-
omy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp76_en.pdf [hereinafter Ec-
onomic Adjustment Programme].
11 Minister’s Statement, DEP’T OF FIN. (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.
finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=5627.
12 Henry McDonald, Ireland’s Unemployment Rises to 11.4%, GUARDIAN, Apr. 29,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/apr/29/economy-ireland-jobless-
rise.
13 Protest in Ireland of Government Handling of Economy, CNN, Feb. 22, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/BUSINESS/02/21/ireland.economy/index.html.
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into the Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank in return for guaran-
tees on lending, a decrease in senior bankers’ pay, delaying collection
of mortgage arrearages, and a government-held 25% indirect stake in
each bank.14
In March of 2009, the Republic of Ireland lost its AAA credit
rating.15 Following this, in April 2009, the Irish government unveiled
its second budget in six months.16 It proposed a National Asset Man-
agement Agency to function as a “bad bank” which would acquire non-
performing development loans in order to improve the availability of
credit broadly to aid the Irish economy.17
In October of 2009, the Irish voted in favor of the Lisbon
treaty,18 which was expected both to protect tens of billions of dollars
invested in Ireland by American companies and to save the govern-
ment up to 200 million euros.19
By March of 2010, the Anglo Irish Bank had reported losses of
12.7 billion euros, the largest such loss in Irish corporate history.20 By
September of 2010, the Irish government had agreed to additional
bailouts, increasing the cost of bailing out Ireland’s banking system to
35 billion euros,21 and raising the country’s deficit to about one third of
its Gross Domestic Product.22
14 Paul O’Brien et al., AIB and BoI To Get 3.5bn Euros Each in Bailout, IRISH
EXAMINER, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/ideymhmhoj/.
15 Ian Guider & Fergal O’Brien, Ireland Loses AAA Rating at S&P on Deficit,
Slump, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=A69.9_yL6P.w.
16 Ireland Unveils Emergency Budget, BBC NEWS, Apr. 7, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/business/7986862.stm.
17 See Quentin Fottrell, Ireland Sets Up Its ‘Bad Bank’ Agency, WALL ST. J., Apr.
9, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123918353240000679.html; see also The
National Asset Management Agency: A Brief Guide, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 30, 2010,
http://www.irishtimes.com/focus/2010/namaguide/index.pdf.
18 Henry McDonald, Ireland Votes Yes to Lisbon Treaty, GUARDIAN, Oct. 3, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/03/ireland-votes-yes-lisbon-treaty.
19 Graham Ruddick, Lisbon Treaty Approval Could Save Ireland 200m Euros a
Year in Debt Costs, TELEGRAPH, Oct. 3, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
economics/6258132/Lisbon-Treaty-approval-could-save-Ireland-200m-a-year-in-
debt-costs.html.
20 Henry McDonald, Anglo Irish Bank Reports 12.7bn Euros Loss As EU Launches
Enquiry into State Aid, GUARDIAN, Mar. 31, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/busi-
ness/2010/mar/31/anglo-irish-bank-10-billion-rescue.
21 Finbarr Flynn & Louisa Fahy, Anglo Irish Cost May Exceed 35 Billion Euros,
S&P Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 28, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-09-28/anglo-irish-cost-may-exceed-35-billion-euros-s-p-says-update1-.html.
22 Irish Deficit Balloons After New Bank Bailout, BBC NEWS, Sept. 30, 2010, http:/
/www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11441473.
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Markets did not respond well to Ireland’s self-imposed mea-
sures, which in large part served only to greater illuminate the scope
of its problems. As a result, the Irish government agreed in November
2010 to an 85 billion euro rescue package with the European Union
and the International Monetary Fund.23 The bailout was for a 16-year
term with interest at just under 6%, and it included, among other ele-
ments, an austerity program comprising four years of both tax in-
creases and spending cuts.24
The result was that the Irish banking system effectively was a
life support system.25 The banking problems were largely the result,
as has been exhaustively documented, of too much mortgage lending
into an unsustainable housing and construction market in a classic
speculative bubble.26 Much of this lending was in turn financed by for-
eign entities.27 The property and construction boom had at least an air
of credibility that it was more than just a bubble.28 Such confidence in
the long-term viability of the real estate boom was based on the pres-
ence of lower interest rates in Ireland following the advent of the euro,
as well as the continuing expansion during the 1990’s of output, em-
ployment, and population.29 And while a number of economists fore-
saw a market correction in housing, few anticipated the eventual
solvency problems of the Irish banking industry.30
All of this is set against the backdrop, of course, of one of the
great economic rises in European history. When Ireland joined the Eu-
ropean Economic Community in 1973, it was the poorest member of
that group, and its economic performance significantly un-
derperformed that of the other members until the late 1980s.31 In a
country where nearly one-third of its citizens lived below the poverty
23 Lane, supra note 2, at 17, 19; see also James G. Neuger & Simon Kennedy,
Ireland Gets $113 Billion Bailout as EU Ministers Seek To Halt Debt Crisis,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 29, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-11-
28/ireland-wins-eu85-billion-aid-germany-drops-threat-on-bonds.html.
24 Lisa O’Carroll, Ireland Bailout: Full Irish Government Statement, GUARDIAN,
Nov. 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/ireland-business-blog-with-
lisa-ocarroll/2010/nov/28/ireland-bailout-full-government-statement.
25 See Honohan, supra note 10, at 207.
26 Id. at 208.
27 Id.
28 See id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See KLAUS REGLING & MAX WATSON, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE SOURCES
OF IRELAND’S BANKING CRISIS 21 (2010), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.
gov.ie/Preliminary%20Report%20into%20Ireland’s%20Banking%20Crisis%2031%
20May%202010.pdf.
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level as recently as the 1980s,32 by the start of the millennium, Ireland
had transformed itself into the second wealthiest country in the world,
according to the Bank of Ireland, with an unemployment rate as low as
4%.33 In 1996, Ireland’s per capita gross national income was 83% of
the EU-15 average, but by 2006 that number had reached 113%.34
Myriad explanations have been offered as to how Ireland be-
came a destination country rather than a country of departure for
workers. The key elements typically noted in such explanations in-
cluded the fact that Ireland had eliminated trade barriers and it had
reduced corporate tax rates. Still, no consensus seems to ever have
emerged as to how exactly the “Celtic Tiger” came to fruition. What is
clear is that the Celtic Tiger was built largely around exports, with
export growth averaging 17.8% between 1996 and 2000.35 Ireland cer-
tainly benefited from the launch of the EU Single Market, but it is
noteworthy that Irish banks did not play a central part in export
financing.36
In the early part of the twenty-first century, however, Irish
banks were able to borrow enormous sums of money from abroad due
to both the global savings glut and the lack of risk associated with
exchange rates once the use of the euro became finalized.37 Without
this massive borrowing from abroad, the Irish property boom could not
have exploded in the same fashion as it did during this period.38 As
32 Tim Callan & Brian Nolan, Income Inequality and Poverty in Ireland in the
1970s and 1980s 14–17 (Econ. & Soc. Res. Inst., Working Paper No. 43, 1993),
available at http://www.esri.ie/UserFiles/publications/20071024100057/WP043.
pdf.
33 Brian McCormick, Unemployment Trends in Ireland 1997–2002, FAS LAB.
MARKET UPDATE, Nov. 2002, at 3, available at http://www.fas.ie/en/pubdocs/Unem-
ploymentTrends1997to2002.pdf.
34 Economic Adjustment Programme, supra note 10, at 6.
35 The Irish Economy in Perspective, DEP’T OF FIN. (June 2011), available at http://
www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/economicstatsetc/irisheconomyjune
2011.pdf.
36 See Patrick Honohan, To What Extent Has Finance Been a Driver of Ireland’s
Economic Success?, ESRI Q. ECON. COMMENT., Dec. 2006, at 59–72, available at
http://www.esri.ie/UserFiles/publications/20061220145614/QEC2006Win_SA_
Honohan%20.pdf.
37 In 2003, Irish banking indebtedness to the rest of the world was approximately
10% of Irish GDP. By 2008, that number had grown to an astonishing 60% of gross
domestic product. Jerome L. Stein, The Diversity of Debt Crises in Europe, 31 CATO
J. 199, 202 (2011), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj31n2/cj31n2-2.
pdf.
38 Clearly other factors were at work as well, such as the lessening of tax restric-
tions in regard to construction. See Gordon Barham, The Effects of Taxation Policy
on the Cost of Capital in Housing – A Historical Profile (1976 – 2003), CBFSAI FIN.
STABILITY REP., 2004.
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additional wealth came into Ireland from thriving exports, a growing
need developed for housing expansion, fueled not only by higher in-
comes but also by a larger population and lower interest rates. The
result was not just a rise in housing prices, but also a dramatic in-
crease in construction. The cost of housing and construction in turn
skyrocketed, with housing price inflation the highest in Europe be-
tween the mid-1990s and 2006.39
Not surprisingly, the degree to which the Irish banks increased
their lending share related to real property was significant as well,
moving from less than 40% of their lending prior in 2002 to greater
than 60% of their lending by 2006.40 Total lending rose precipitously
as well, with a growth in lending by the covered banks41 rising from
120 billion euros in 2000 to almost 400 billion euros in 2007.42 In fact,
the average growth rate to Irish households between 2004 and 2006
was almost 30%.43 A significant imbalance in the funding structure of
Irish banks resulted from these lending changes. The loan-to-deposit
ratio of Irish banks with respect to domestic resident clients grew from
133% in January of 2003 to 215% by May of 2008.44 This gap could
only be ameliorated by more borrowing from international capital
markets.
Yet, all of this occurred despite the increasing recognition that
housing prices had likely exceeded their equilibrium point and the
scale of new construction had become a cause of concern.45 As early as
2007, Morgan Kelly was the first to notably question whether the Irish
banks could survive the anticipated drop in housing prices.46 And fall
they did, with estimates for the decline in housing prices ranging from
a 38% decrease between 2006 and 2010 to a number as high as a 75%
39 Economic Adjustment Programme, supra note 10, at 6; see also David Rae &
Paul van den Noord, Ireland’s Housing Boom: What Has Driven It and Have Prices
Overshot? (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 492, 2006); Janis Malzubris,
Ireland’s Housing Market: Bubble Trouble, 5 ECFIN COUNTRY FOCUS (Sept. 26,
2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/countryfocus
_en.htm.
40 See Honohan, supra note 10, at 209.
41 The six primary domestic credit institutions were the Bank of Ireland, Allied
Irish Banks, Anglo, Irish Bank, Irish Life and Permanent, Irish Nationwide Build-
ing Society, and the Educational Building Society.
42 Economic Adjustment Programme, supra note 10, at fig. 3.
43 Id. at fig. 5.
44 Id. at 10.
45 See IMF, Ireland: Selected Issues, at 35, IMF Country Report No. 04/349 (Nov.
2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04349.pdf.
46 See Morgan Kelly, Banking on Very Shaky Foundations, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 7,
2007, at 3, available at http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2007/09/07/2919218.htm.
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drop in value during this time period.47 As in the United States, a
credit crunch ensued. This was true of financing to individual house-
holds for housing and consumption as well as to the non-financial cor-
porate sector.48
The Irish economy was effectively thrown into chaos.
On September 21, 2010, the Irish government established a
Statutory Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ire-
land.49 In March of 2011, the Commission issued a report entitled
“Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic Banking Crisis in Ireland.”50
One key finding of the Commission was that the willingness of Irish
banks to accept enormous risk and make “shockingly” large loans pri-
marily for commercial property was a significant factor in the eventual
instability of the Irish economy.51 There was a gradual adaptation of
lower credit standards by Irish banks as a way of ensuring market
share and profitability.52 Bank loans expanded enormously and
quickly because “neither banks nor borrowers apparently really under-
stood the risks they were taking,” as the long increase in property val-
ues “eroded the awareness both of banks and customers in Ireland.”53
Thus, “both sides of the market assumed that the other side knew
what it was doing.”54
What evolved was a self-reinforcing upward spiral. Easy credit
increased property prices, and increased property prices resulted in
easy credit. Meanwhile, regulation was clearly insufficient. Although
both the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator noted the exis-
tence of macroeconomic risk in Ireland as the result of banking prac-
tice, neither took decisive action to restrain questionable banking
47 See Economic Adjustment Programme, supra note 10, at 10; see also Patrick
Koucheravy, Latest Figures Suggest a 75% Fall in Land Values, DAFT.IE (Oct. 5,
2010), available at http://www.daft.ie/report/patrick-koucheravy.
48 There are numerous statistics illustrating this. For example, during the last
three months of 2010, the average net flow of lending to households decreased 413
million euros for the three months ending December 2010, and lending to the non-
financial corporate sector declined 1.2% during calendar year 2010. See CENTRAL
BANK OF IRELAND, MONEY AND BANKING STATISTICS: DECEMBER 2010 (2011), avail-
able at www.centralbank.ie/polstats/stats/cmab/Documents/2010m12_ie_monthly_
statistics.pdf.
49 Commissions of Investigation Act 2004 (Act No. 23/2004) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2004/en/act/pub/0023/index.html.
50 COMM’N OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE BANKING SECTOR IN IRELAND, MISJUDGING
RISK: CAUSES OF THE SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISIS IN IRELAND (2011), available at
http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Documents/Misjuding%20Risk%20-%20Causes
%20of%20the%20Systemic%20Banking%20Crisis%20in%20Ireland.pdf.
51 Id. at ii.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at iii.
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decision-making.55 What’s more, the International Monetary Fund,
the European Union, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development were, though occasionally nominally critical, on the
whole, supportive of the direction of the Irish economy during the criti-
cal years at the start of the 21st century.
III. IRISH INSOLVENCY LAW
There are, in essence, four forms of insolvency law in Ireland.56
The first is bankruptcy, the insolvency procedure related to natural
persons or partnerships comprised of natural persons.57 Irish bank-
ruptcy law is governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1988.58 The second
form of an insolvency proceeding is liquidation, which can occur either
55 In fact, the Commission noted the following:
1.4.3: For a systemic financial crisis to occur, at least the follow-
ing factors must be present (although the last two may not be as
essential as the others):
• a sufficiently large number of households and investors who, at
some point, start making serious mistakes in judging the value
and liquidity of their major assets, holdings, and projects;
• banks that provide financing, large in relation to their own cap-
ital, for these investments without thoroughly and sufficiently
evaluating prospects and the creditworthiness of borrowers in
the longer term;
• providers of funds to such banks (often banks themselves but
also depositors) that do not monitor bank soundness with suffi-
cient diligence, in the case of private providers, possibly because
of perceived implicit public support for at least important banks;
• a banking regulator that remains unwilling or unable to detect
or prevent banks from engaging in excessively risky lending or
funding practices;
• a government and a central bank that remains unaware of the
mounting problems or is unwilling to do anything to prevent
them;
• a parliament that remains unaware of the mounting problems
or concentrates its attention on other things perceived to be of
greater immediate importance; and
• media that are generally supportive of corporate and bank ex-
pansion, profit growth and risk taking while being dismissive of
warnings of unsustainable developments. Id. at 5.
56 The source of the laws governing liquidations in Ireland are a mix of corporate
law, including the Companies Acts of 1963 and 2000, commercial law, contract
law, property law, and equity and trust law. See ADRIAN BENSON & LOCRAN TIER-
NAN, CORPORATE INSOLVENCY IN IRELAND 1 (2009), available at http://www.dillon
eustace.ie/download/1/Corporate%20Insolvency%20in%20Ireland.pdf.
57 Bankruptcy Act of 1988 (Act No. 27/1988) (Ir.), available at http://www.irish
statutebook.ie/1988/en/act/pub/0027/index.html.
58 Id.
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voluntarily59 or by force.60 The third option is receivership,61 and the
fourth – the corporate rescue provision — is known as examinership.
Liquidations are, in effect, a form of collective debt collection.
They constitute a winding up of the affairs of the company.62 Typically
included in this process are gathering assets, fulfilling or terminating
outstanding contractual obligations, discharging company debt, and
distributing company assets to creditors.63 Once the liquidation is
complete, the company is dissolved and it is stricken from the company
registry.64
Liquidations divide roughly into two kinds, those accomplished
outside of court and those which transpire under court supervision,
with the latter typically known as an involuntary, compulsory, or offi-
cial winding up.65 Company shareholders may opt to wind up the af-
fairs of the company outside of court supervision – that is, on a
voluntary basis.66 This is known as a “members winding up,” and it
requires that the company be solvent at the time the resolution is
passed.67 Under this form of proceeding, creditors must be paid in
full.68 In fact, directors of the company are obligated to file with the
Registrar of Companies a statutory Declaration of Solvency, which in-
dicates that the company will be able to pay its debts in full within 12
months of commencing the liquidation.69 Upon such a filing, a liquida-
tor is appointed, and upon his or her appointment, the powers of the
directors are terminated.70
59 MICHAEL FORDE & HUGH KENNEDY, COMPANY LAW (4th ed. 2008).
60 For example, by court order. Id.
61 BENSON & TIERNAN, supra note 56.
62 Id.; see Companies Act of 1963 (Act No. 33/1988) (Ir.), available at http://www.
irishstatutebook.ie/1963/en/act/pub/0033/index.html.
63 BENSON & TIERNAN, supra note 56, at 1–2.
64 Id. at 1; see Companies Act, supra note 62, § 221.
65 BENSON & TIERNAN, supra note 56, at 1–2.
66 See Companies Act, supra note 62, §§ 257–64.
67 See id. § 251(1)(a) and (b):
(1) A company may be wound up voluntarily:
(a) when the period, if any, fixed for the duration of the com-
pany by the articles expires, or the event, if any, occurs,
on the occurrence of which the articles provide that the
company is to be dissolved, and the company in general
meeting has passed a resolution that the company be
wound up voluntarily;
(b) if the company resolves by special resolution that the
company be wound up voluntarily . . .
68 See id. § 256.
69 Id.
70 Id. § 267.
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A second form of voluntary winding up is known as a “creditors
winding up.” Creditors winding up deals with scenarios where the
company is in fact insolvent and cannot pay its debts as they become
due.71 Under such circumstances, the shareholders, frequently on a
recommendation from the board of directors, decide to put the com-
pany in liquidation. A creditors’ meeting is subsequently called, where
a liquidator’s appointment is confirmed.72
Compulsory liquidations are situations where a court orders
the winding up of a company.73 Section 213 of the Companies Act of
1963 sets out a number of circumstances where this is appropriate,
including, most commonly, when the company cannot pay its debts as
they become due. One or more creditors with undisputed debts typi-
cally bring such a request. If a court grants a winding up order, the
company is placed in liquidation and an official liquidator is ap-
pointed. The official liquidator becomes the company’s sole officer.74
Receivership is essentially a method of enforcing a security,
and is not in fact a true collective proceeding; however, it is frequently
treated as a form of insolvency procedure. There are a number of dif-
ferent types of receiverships. The most common form is the scenario
where a secured creditor, usually a lending institution, appoints a re-
ceiver under contractual powers granted by the company in a deben-
ture/charge.75 The debenture is a contractual document and all of the
powers of the debenture holder and of the receiver are governed by this
document except for a small number of statutory provisions.76 The re-
ceiver’s appointment extends only over the assets that have been
charged. The appointment of the receiver does not alter the legal sta-
tus of the company; rather, its result is that the directors cease to exert
control over the assets on which the Receivership has been granted.
The directors’ normal powers continue, however, with regard to other
assets and liabilities of the company. Receivership is a temporary con-
dition that does not necessarily lead to liquidation. The principal func-
tion of the receiver is to realize the charged assets and to distribute the
71 Id.  § 251(c) (stating that a voluntary wind up may also occur “if the company in
general meeting resolves that it cannot by reason of its liabilities continue its busi-
ness, and that it be wound up voluntarily”).
72 Companies Act, supra note 62, § 258.
73 While called “compulsory,” an involuntary winding up may be initiated by
shareholders. Id. § 215.
74 The liquidator’s powers are set out in § 231.
75 Dillon Eustace, Corporate Insolvency in Ireland, at 7, available at http://www.
dilloneustace.ie/download/1/Corporate%20Insolvency%20in%20Ireland.pdf; see
also Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., c. 41, §§ 19-24
(Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1881/41/pdfs/ukpga_1881
0041_en.pdf.
76 Id.
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proceeds to the holder of the charge, subject to any other valid
priorities.77
Examinership, the corporate rescue scheme that is the focus of
this article, is an attempt to facilitate the rescue of an insolvent, or
nearly insolvent, company. Its origins are in the Companies Act of
1990, which was enacted under unusual circumstances. When Iraq in-
vaded Kuwait in 1990, a United Nations trade embargo was imposed.
The Irish company Goodman International, which exported the major-
ity of Irish beef to Iraq, was therefore in serious financial straits. In
response to the company’s difficulties, the Irish government decided to
introduce and enact a stand-alone piece of insolvency legislation.78
This legislation, with minor amendments, was subsequently encom-
passed within The Companies (Amendment) Act, 1990.79
Like other corporate rescue regimes, the purpose of Examiner-
ship is to provide for the rescue and return to financial viability of eco-
nomically troubled but potentially viable enterprises. And like other
corporate rescue schemes, Examinership requires a balance, as the
“laudable”80 goal of preserving failing companies requires “an excep-
tional jurisdiction. . . which negatively affects the rights of creditors.”81
As Justice Clarke stated in Re Traffic Group Limited:82
“It is clear that the principal focus of the legislation is to
enable, in an appropriate case, an enterprise to continue
in existence for the benefit of the economy as a whole
and, of equal, or indeed greater, importance to enable as
many as possible of the jobs which may be at stake in
such enterprise to be maintained for the benefit of the
community in which the relevant employment is located.
It is important both for the court and, indeed, for exam-
iners, to keep in mind that such is the focus of the legis-
lation. It is not designed to help shareholders whose
investment has proved to be unsuccessful. It is to seek to
save the enterprise and jobs.”83
77 Id. at 8.
78 126 SEANAD DEB. col. 1059 (Aug. 29, 1990) (Ir.).
79 Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990 (Act No. 27/1990) (Ir.) (as amended by the
Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act of 1999) (Act No. 30/1999) (Ir.) (as amended
by §§ 180-81 of the Companies Act of 1990) (Ir.) (providing for the appointment of
an Examiner to a company); Rules of the Superior Court (S.I. No. 147/ 1991) (Ir.)
(Order 74A of the Rules of the Superior Courts dealing with the procedure to be
followed in Examinership applications), available at www.irishstatutebook.ie/
1991/en/si/0147.html.
80 See Re Vantive Holdings Ltd. (No. 2) [2009] I.E.S.C. 69 (Ir.).
81 See id. ¶ 30.
82 Re Traffic Group Limited, [2008] 2 I.L.R.M. 1 (Ir.).
83 Id. ¶ 5.5.
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Under Examinership, an insolvent, or nearly insolvent, com-
pany is entitled to a 70-day period during which it has “protection of
the court.”84 During this period, general creditors cannot pursue their
claims, nor can guarantees be enforced.85  In addition, subject to cer-
tain protections, secured creditors cannot exercise their security, ex-
cept where permitted by the Examiner. Further, the company cannot
be subject to a resolution to wind up the company, and no receiver can
be appointed.86
The Examinership petition may be initiated by any of four par-
ties or by some combination of the parties jointly. The parties are the
company itself, the directors of the company, a creditor of the com-
pany, or contingent or prospective creditors of the company, including
employees.87 There is a duty to act with utmost good faith. The court
may decline to hear the petition if the petitioner has either failed to
disclose relevant, available information or has in any other way failed
to exercise the utmost good faith.88  Over-optimism about the com-
pany’s long-term prospects is not a per se indication of bad faith, how-
ever, and even where bad faith is established, whether to refuse the
petition on that ground remains within the court’s discretion.89
84 Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, §5(2) (Act No. 27/1990)
(Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1990/en/act/pub/0027/sec0005.
html#sec5. The petition must be filed with utmost good faith, and may be dis-
missed by the High Court as an abuse of process and no scheme of arrangement
allowed in its absence. See Re Wogans (Drogheda) Ltd, [1993] 1 I.R. 157 (H. Ct.)
(Ir.); see also Companies (Amendment) Act § 4A (indicating that a court may de-
cline to hear a petition if it appears that the petitioner or the accountant have
failed to disclose materially relevant information).
85 See Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, § 5(2)(f), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1990/en/act/pub/0027.html; Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Williams, 851 F.2d 119, 121 (4th Cir. 1988).
86 Id. § 5(2).
87 See Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, § 3. However, where a
Petition is being presented by a contingent or prospective creditor the court shall
not hear the Petition until such security for costs has been given as the court con-
siders reasonable. See id. § (3)(5).
88 See Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, § 4; In re Wogans
(Drogheda) Ltd., [1993] 1991 H. Ct. 15465 (Ir.).
89 Re Tuskar Resources PLC, [2001] 1 I.R. 668, 677 (Ir.); see also Re Traffic Group
Ltd., [2007] I.E.H.C. 445 (Ir.). In Re Traffic Group Ltd., the court noted the “signif-
icant obligation” on the petitioners to ensure that the financial state of the com-
pany is presented to the court in as accurate a way as is practically possible in the
circumstances. However, the Court held that the statement of the company’s fi-
nancial position in the Petition need only be relatively accurate to form a proper
basis for considering the scheme. Id.
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Procedurally, under the E.C. Insolvency Regulation,90 any pri-
mary insolvency proceeding, including Examinerships, must be com-
menced in the member state where the company has its center of main
interests, though secondary proceedings solely for the purpose of liqui-
dation – not to attempt an examinership restructuring – may be com-
menced in another member state in which the company has an
establishment.91 The verifying affidavit of the Petitioner should con-
tain an averment that Ireland is the centre of main interests of the
company.
The statutory test for the appointment of an Examiner requires
a two-step process. First, the Petitioner must establish that the com-
pany has reasonable prospects of survival, as a whole or in any signifi-
cant part of its undertakings as a going concern (the “reasonable
prospects of survival” standard); and second, if there are reasonable
prospects of survival, the court should, “in all the relevant circum-
stances of the case” exercise its discretion to appoint an Examiner.92
Even if these standards are met, the decision to appoint an Examiner
is not automatic; rather, the Court will weigh the competing interests
in the case to determine if Examinership is in the best overall interest
of all interested parties.93
90 Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 2 (EC), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:160:0001:001:en:PDF.
91 Id. at 5; see also Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. I-3854, 59, 67,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=56604&pageIndex=0&
doclang=en&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=296776. Note, “secondary
proceedings” may only concern “winding-up” proceedings and this does not include
Examinerships. See Council Regulation 1346/2000, Annex B, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 2
(EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:
2000:160:0001:001:en:PDF.
92 See Re Vantive Holdings, [2009] I.E.H.C. 409 (Ir.).
93 Re Gallium Ltd., [2009] I.E.S.C. 8 (Ir.) (explaining:
“[A] petitioner does not, by getting over that threshold, ac-
quire a right to have an order made. I still think it is fair to say
that the section confers a ‘wide discretion’ on the court, or alter-
natively, that the court should take account of all the circum-
stances. The establishment of a reasonable prospect of the
survival merely triggers the power, which remains discretion-
ary. . . The court has the power to appoint an examiner if satis-
fied that there is a reasonable prospect of survival of the
company. The entire purpose of examinership is to make it possi-
ble to rescue companies in difficulty. The protection period is
there to facilitate examination of the prospects of rescue. How-
ever, that protection may prejudice the interests of some credi-
tors. The court will weigh the existence and degree of any such
prejudice in the balance. It will have regard to the report of the
independent accountant.
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Examinership is in force as soon as the petition for Examiner-
ship is presented, as long as the petition for Examinership is accompa-
nied by a report of an independent accountant.94 The independent
accountant’s report must include, among other things, the names and
addresses of the officers of the company, a report on the company’s
assets and liabilities, a listing of creditors and a detailing of the secur-
ity interests they hold, an opinion on what should be done in regard to
any fraudulent conveyances or reckless trading that has transpired,
recommendations as to which, if any, pre-petition liabilities of the
debtor should be paid by the examiner, details as to how the company
should be funded during the examination period, an opinion of
whether the assets of the company have been satisfactorily accounted
for, the accountant’s opinion of whether the company has a reasonable
likelihood of survival,95 a statement of conditions necessary to ensure
company survival, and an opinion on whether trying to continue the
company in whole or in part would be advantageous to members and
creditors.96 Interestingly, the Court may allow certain information to
be deleted before the report is made publicly available, most notably
certain information which could act to the detriment of the long-term
survival of the financially distressed entity.
When such conditions are met, the High Court may appoint an
Examiner. According to section 2(2) of the Corporations Act: “The court
The court has to take account of all relevant interests. The
independent accountant must consider whether examinership
would ‘be more advantageous to the members as a whole and the
creditors as a whole than a winding-up of the company. . .’ This
does not limit the range of interests to be taken into account by
the court under section 2. The interests of employees cannot be
excluded. In the case of an insolvent company, it is natural that
the creditors will have the greatest interest in the future, if any,
of the company. The court will take a balanced approach, as sug-
gested by the reference to the creditors as a whole.”)
94 See Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, § 3(3)(a), available
at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1990/en/act/pub/0027/sec0003.html#sec3. If for
some reason the report cannot immediately be made available, the Court retains
the right to place the Company under interim protection for a period of time not to
exceed 10 days. Id. § 3(3a(1)).
95 See, e.g., Re Gallium Ltd. [2009], I.E.S.C. 8 (Ir.) ([N]oting the role of the inde-
pendent accountant’s report, Justice Fennelly stressed that it “must consider
whether examinership would be ‘be more advantageous to the members as a whole
and the creditors as a whole than a winding-up of the company. . .”); see also Com-
panies (Amendment) Act of 1990 (Act No. 27/1990) (Ir.) § 3(b) (stating an individ-
ual reaching the conclusion that Examinership is an appropriate next step for the
failing Company is not required); Re Tuskar Resources PLC [2001], 1 I.R. 668 (Ir.).
96 Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, § 2(2), available at http://
www.irishstatutesbook.ie/1990/en/act/pub/0027/index.html.
422 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:4
shall not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that
there is a reasonable prospect of the survival of the company and the
whole or any part of its undertaking as a going concern.”97 This ap-
proach displaced a more liberal approach whereby mere likelihood of
facilitating survival was enough to justify Examinership for companies
that were effectively insolvent,98 with insolvency encompassing a sce-
nario where the company was either unable to pay its debts as they
became due99 or where the company’s liabilities exceeded its assets.100
In terms of what constitutes “a reasonable prospect of survival,” the
High Court stated in Re Vantive Holdings (No. 2):
“Given that the whole purpose of the legislation is to fa-
cilitate the survival of enterprises and employment . . .,
then it seems to me clear that that survival must be mea-
sured over a reasonable timeframe such as there would
be some point from the perspective of society as a whole
in facilitating that survival even at the cost of some cred-
itors having to forgo their strict legal entitlements. In
those circumstances, there does not seem to me to be any
magic formula for the length of time which a company
should be anticipated to survive after it comes out of a
successful examinership. Each case needs to be consid-
ered on its own facts.”101
The Examiner’s function is to formulate proposals and prepare
a report for a compromise or a scheme of arrangement between the
company, its members, and its creditors. Such a scheme typically in-
volves a combination of new investment, a write down of creditors’
claims, and a payout of dividends to creditors over a period of
months.102
97 Id. Similar to the rule in regard to the report, § 3 of the Companies Act of 1990
allows for in camera proceedings when the Court is convinced that a public hear-
ing would result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information that
would be financially damaging to the company’s survival prospects.
98 Id. The Court can make such an appointment when three conditions are pre-
sent. First, the company either is, or is likely to be, unable to pay its debts as they
become due. Second, there is no resolution for the winding up of the company.
Finally, there has been no order for the winding up of the company.
99 See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (West 2012) (discussing the standard for “insolvency” for
involuntary petitions under American Bankruptcy law).
100 See id. § 2(3) (including prospective and contingent liabilities).
101 See Re Vantive Holdings  [2009], 2 I.E.H.C. 409 (Ir.).
102 See id. at 3.11 (“In the normal sort of examinership to which I have referred,
any such scheme of arrangement may involve the writing off of debt (which has, of
course, to be seen in the context of the fact that a liquidation of the company -
which is normally the only alternative - will probably lead to the writing off of the
same, or a greater amount of debt, in any event), together with, in many cases, the
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The Examiner’s powers in terms of investigation and operation
are broad. They include the same powers that would inhere in an audi-
tor in terms of the supplying of information and cooperation. The Ex-
aminer can convene, set an agenda for, and preside at meetings of the
Board of Directors.103 He or she may supervise the management of the
company and can enter into contractual relationships with third par-
ties.104 During the period of Examinership – as in other reorganization
schemes globally – the company continues to trade. The directors gen-
erally remain in control of, and retain responsibility for, the day-to-day
operations of the company, though the Court does have the ability to
curtail any or all of the director’s powers and transfer them to the Ex-
aminer for cause.105 This is, of course, in stark contrast to liquidation,
where the director’s powers cease upon the appointment of a liquida-
tor. In similar fashion, the ability to affirm or repudiate a contract in-
volving some additional element of performance other than payment
under § 20 is given to the company, not to the Examiner. As in the
United States with executory contracts, this ability includes the right
to repudiate or affirm leases.106
Subsequently, the Examiner calls one or more meetings of
creditors and members to vote on the scheme of arrangement prof-
fered. The Examiner’s scheme will be deemed carried at a particular
meeting if two voting criteria are met. First, a simple majority of the
total number of creditors must favor the proposal; second, those credi-
tors so voting must hold a majority of the total creditor claims in mone-
tary value.107 Additionally, the scheme of arrangement must
incorporate a number of elements including each class of members and
creditors of the company, which classes of creditors are impaired for
voting purposes,108 the implementation of the proposals, what changes
injection of new capital. Any shortfall in the net assets of the company is normally
proposed to be addressed in that way. On that basis, the court can form a reasona-
ble estimate of whether the combination of debt write off and capital injection that
might be anticipated would be sufficient to solve the problem. Likewise, the court
will normally want to be satisfied that, providing that any such net deficiency in
the company’s assets can be met, what remains of the undertaking of the company,
as of the date of the implementation of a possible scheme of arrangement, is such
as will have reasonable prospects of survival into the future from that date.”).
103 Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, § 7.
104 The Examiner is personally liable for such contracts, but is entitled to indem-
nification for any liability from the Company. See id. § 13(6).
105 See id. § 3(8).
106 See Re Chartbusters Ltd., [2009] 5 C.O.S. (Ir.).
107 Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, §18 (Act No. 27/1990)
(Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1990/en/act/pub/0027/index.html.
108 A creditor is impaired for purposes of the voting if it will not be paid the full
amount owed under the proposals. Id. § 22(5).
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will be made to the management or directors of the company, what
changes will be made to the articles of the company, and whatever
other matters the Examiner deems relevant.109
Further, § 24(4) of the Corporations Act provides that certain
requirements must be satisfied before a court may confirm the propos-
als. For example, it requires that at least one class of creditors whose
interests are impaired has accepted the plan. In the event this criteria
is not met, the requirement may be satisfied if the Court determines
that the proposals are fair and equitable in relation to any class of
creditors that has not accepted the proposals and whose interests
would be impaired by them, and that the proposals are not “unfairly
prejudicial” to the interests of any interested parties.110
There is some debate as to what it means to be “unfairly preju-
dicial.” While it generally appears that the mere fact that a creditor
neither receives full payment under the scheme of arrangement nor
receives at least what it would get in a liquidation does not per se indi-
cate that the scheme is “unfairly prejudicial”; yet, there is precedent
suggesting that secured creditors cannot be forced over their objection
to accept less than the value of their security in settlement of a
debt.111  Unsecured creditors, however, are not entitled to the amount
they would have received in liquidation. Courts have differentiated be-
tween proposals that are prejudicial to the interests of the objector and
those that are unfairly prejudicial.112 While the position of the un-
secured creditor is typically compared with the position in a winding-
up, the fact that the unsecured creditor will fare worse in the Ex-
aminership is no prohibition to confirming the scheme so long as the
discrepancy is not extreme and disproportionate to the disparity as it
relates to other creditors.113
The Examiner is required to report to the Court on the outcome
of the meetings of members and creditors.114 This must occur within
35 days of his or her appointment, unless the court grants additional
time.115 While the Examiner should present his or her report as soon
109 Id. § 22(f)-(h).
110 Id. § 24(4).
111 See, e.g., Re Sharmand Ltd., [2008] 514 COS (where the secured creditor ar-
gued successfully that there is no precedent for the involuntary writing down of
secured debt in an Examinership).
112 Re Holidair Ltd., [1994] I.L.R.M. 481 (Ir); Re Antigen Holdings, [2001] 4 I.R.
600, 604 (Ir.).
113 See Re Traffic Group Ltd., [2007] I.E.H.C. 445; [2008] 2 I.L.R.M. 1; [2008] 3
I.R. 253 (Ir.).
114 Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, § 23(4).
115 Extensions beyond 35 days are common, as are extensions of up to 100 days.
Companies (Amendment) Act of 1990, supra note 79, § 18(2); Companies (Amend-
ment) (No. 2) Act § 22(b) (Act No. 30/1999) (Ir.).
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as is practicable after appointment,116 upon showing good cause, the
Examiner may have up to 100 days from the date of the presentation
of the Petition to present his or her report.117 If the Examiner cannot
formulate any proposals, he or she must report that fact to the court,
and the court will then normally order the winding-up of the
company.118
When the court confirms a scheme of arrangement, it becomes
binding upon the company, its members, and the company’s credi-
tors.119 The scheme becomes effective at the time the court orders, but
no later than 21 days after the date of confirmation.120 The company
then resumes its ordinary operation with its affairs restructured, and
the protection afforded the company ceases.121 If the scheme is not
confirmed by the court or is not successfully implemented, then protec-
tion of the court is removed.122 Following the removal of such protec-
tion, the norm is that either a liquidation or receivership will follow in
short order.
IV. COMMON LAW COUNTERPARTS – AUSTRALIA AND THE
UNITED STATES
To establish the potential effectiveness of Examinership, a
brief contrast with two of its common law counterparts is potentially
revealing. The two approaches – one Australian, one from the United
States – stand at opposite ends in terms of approach, with Examiner-
ship a seemingly reasonable hybrid middle ground.
A. Australian Voluntary Administration
Australian insolvency law is designed with creditor interests at
the forefront. The modern law – enacted in 1993 and known as “Volun-
tary Administration” – is intended to maximize the value of the on-
going business and preserve the interests of employees and suppliers,
while still fully protecting the value of the company’s creditors’ inter-
116 Companies (Amendment) Act § 22(1)(a).
117 The Court cannot extend the time period for the Report. However, once the
Report has been presented, the court may extend the protection period, if neces-
sary, to enable the court to make the decision whether or not to approve the Exam-
iner’s proposals. Id. at §§ 18(3), (4); Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act § 22(c).
118 Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act, supra note 79, §§ 22(3).
119 Companies (Amendment) Act, supra note 79, §§ 24(5)-(6).
120 Id. § 24(9).
121 Id. § 26.
122 See id. § 24(11).
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ests should liquidation ultimately become unavoidable.123 Voluntary
Administration was expressly designed to be a rapid, inexpensive,
straightforward, and flexible means of dealing with troubled compa-
nies124 that are either insolvent or “likely to become insolvent.”125 The
system has two parts. First, there is an appointment of an Administra-
tor; and second, the company operates under a deed of company ar-
rangement.126 The deed of company arrangement is a fairly simple
document that largely serves the same function as an Irish scheme of
arrangement and an American plan of reorganization in Chapter
11.127
An Administrator must be a registered Insolvency Practi-
tioner,128 and his or her appointment is typically accomplished by the
123 See Corporations Act 2007 (Cth) sub-reg 435A (Austl.) (“The object of this Part
is to provide for the business, property, and affairs of an insolvent company to be
administered in a way that:
(a) maximises the chances of the company, or as much as possible
of its business, continuing in existence; or
(b) if it is not possible for the company or its business to continue
in existence – results in a better return for the company’s credi-
tors and members than would result from an immediate winding
up of the company.”)
124 See 1 The Law Reform Commission, Report No. 45, General Insolvency In-
quiry, ¶ 54 (1988) (Austl.) (“The procedure proposed was designed with the aim
that it would be capable of swift implementation, as uncomplicated and inexpen-
sive as possible and flexible, providing alternative forms of dealing with the finan-
cial affairs of the company.”).
125 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 436A (Austl.). By “Insolvent,” what is
meant is a company that is unable to pay its debts as they become due. See id. reg
95A. While the name suggests the voluntary nature of the proceedings, Voluntary
Administration can occur involuntarily. Pursuant to § 436B(1), “A liquidator or
provisional liquidator of a company may by writing appoint an administrator of
the company if he or she thinks that the company is insolvent, or is likely to be
insolvent at some future time.” Id. § 436B(1). In addition, pursuant to § 436C, it
can also be commenced by a creditor holding a lien over all or substantially all of
the Company’s assets. See id. § 436C(1) (“A person who is entitled to enforce secur-
ity interest in the whole, or substantially the whole, of a company’s property may
by writing appoint an administrator of the company if the security interest has
become, and is still, enforceable.”).
126 See The Law Reform Commission, supra note 124, ¶ 56.
127 A deed of arrangement is by design far more straightforward than other meth-
ods available to insolvent companies in Australia. It is a “simplified document of
much less size and complexity than the present forms of ‘scheme documents’ that
oppress creditors and others. The deed will incorporate (by simple reference) stan-
dard provisions contained in a schedule to the company’s legislation. . . .” Id. ¶ 8.
128 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 448B (Austl.). A person must consent
to the appointment and can only act as administrator of a company or a deed of
trust if he or she is a registered liquidator.
2012] BUSINESS INSOLVENCY AND THE IRISH DEBT CRISIS 427
company’s directors merely signing a form.129 In juxtaposition to Ex-
aminership, there is no need for a court filing.130 The role of the courts
in a Voluntary Administration is nominal and is largely limited to gen-
eral supervision.131 The rationale for keeping courts at a distance is
telling. What transpires in a Voluntary Administration concerns solely
the company and its creditors. As the restructuring is not seen as hav-
ing broad social import, despite the potential effect on the company’s
employees, its suppliers, and its neighboring businesses, the ultimate
resolution should be a reflection of that which is in the creditors’ best
interests.132 Indeed, one of the express aims of the law is to protect
creditor interests if the company is unsalvageable by providing “a
more advantageous realization of the company’s assets than would be
effected” by an immediate winding-up.133
Upon the appointment of an Administrator, with certain excep-
tions, an immediate moratorium on all claims is established.134 The
Administrator cannot wind up the company via liquidation,135 nor,
may liens be enforced, save one major exception.136 Further, neither
owners nor lessors of property the company uses may reclaim their
129 In addition to directors, liquidators and creditors with liens over substantially
all of the company’s assets can also appoint an administrator. Id. §§ 436A-C. Em-
pirical studies have shown that 98% of administrations, in fact, commence by ap-
pointment made by the company’s directors. See ROMAN TOMASIC & KETURAH
WHITFORD, AUSTRALIAN INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW 168 (2d ed. 1997).
Neither unsecured nor undersecured creditors may appoint an administrator.
130 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 436A (Austl.). Instead of a court pro-
ceeding, the document of appointment is filed with the Australian Securities Com-
mission and appropriately made public.
131 The Australian Law Reform Commission contemplated only a supervisory
function for courts in the Voluntary Administration process. The Commission rec-
ommended “that the court have a broad power to make orders for the effective
operation of the procedure. Although provision for extensive involvement of the
court has been avoided to simplify and reduce the time and expense of the proce-
dure, the court should have a role to ensure that the procedure operates in accor-
dance with the law.” The Law Reform Commission, supra note 124, ¶ 62.
132 See generally K.J. Bennetts, Voluntary Administration: Shaping the Process
Through the Exercise of Judicial Discretion, 3 INSOLVENCY L.J. 135 (1995).
133 See The Law Reform Commission,  supra note 124, ¶ 35.
134 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 440 (Austl.). This is consistent with
the automatic stay provisions listed in 11 U.S.C. § 362. Justifications for the Aus-
tralian moratorium are similar to those for the American automatic stay. For ex-
ample, they provide for orderly administration of debtors’ affairs rather than a
race to the courthouse door, and they preserve certain assets for the state that
may be necessary for successful reorganization.
135 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 440A(1) (Austl.).
136 Id. sub-reg 440B.
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property as a general matter.137 The moratorium not only serves the
purpose of halting creditor collection efforts, but it also provides leave
for the Administrator to investigate the company’s affairs and to ac-
cordingly prepare a report for use by the creditors.
There is, however, one major exception to the breadth of the
§ 440(d) moratorium. Upon appointment, an administrator must no-
tify any holder of a charge over all, or substantially all, of the com-
pany’s property of his her or her appointment.138 That creditor then
has the right to enforce its charge within a certain proscribed pe-
riod.139 This time period is referred to as the decision period.140 Since
the company cannot stop a majority lien holder from enforcing its in-
terest during the decision period,141 the effect is that a secured credi-
tor can effectively opt out of an Australian bankruptcy proceeding and
foreclose on property following default.142 While many critics initially
feared that secured creditors would routinely exercise their rights pur-
suant to this exception, this has not transpired as frequently as origi-
nally thought.143
Unlike the situation with Examinerships, the appointment of
an Administrator largely suspends the powers of the officers of the cor-
137 Id. sub-reg 440B(1).
138 See id. sub-reg 450A(3).
139 See id. sub-reg 441A. While the provision governing secured creditors with a
lien over substantially all of the company’s assets is by far the most significant
exception to the moratorium, two others do exist. First, secured creditors who have
acted to enforce their rights prior to the appointment of the administrator may
also enforce their lien, as may creditors with a security interest in perishable prop-
erty. See id. §§ 441B, 441C, 441F.
140 The decision period is typically 10 to 14 days. If the creditor fails to act within
that time, he may still give notice pursuant to his security interest that he will
enforce his interest when the administration ends. See Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) sub-reg 441E (Austl.).
141 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 441A(3) (Austl.).
142 By contrast, the Chapter 11 approach forces the secured creditor to participate
in the bankruptcy process unless one of two primary circumstances has been met,
in which case the creditor can lift the automatic stay. The first circumstance is
“cause,” including the lack of adequate protection. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (West
2012). The second circumstance is when the debtor has no equity in the property,
and the property is not needed for an effective reorganization. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)(2).
143 See Ron W. Harmer, Bankruptcy in the Global Village: Comparison of Trends
in National Law: The Pacific Rim, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 139, 148–49 (1997). Per-
haps one reason why banks have been reluctant to routinely exercise this right is
the fear of negative publicity because their financial best interests may not corre-
late with the financial well-being of the business community at large.
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poration,144 and the Administrator obtains these powers.145 If a com-
pany’s officers violate this provision, however, they may be held
personally liable for any debts incurred.146
The Administrator handles both company operations and in-
vestigations into the company’s affairs. Following appointment, pro-
ceedings in court or in relation to the company’s property can only
commence with either the written consent of the Administrator147 or
with leave of court.148 Additionally, any transfer of shares is void ab-
sent court approval.149 The Administrator further acts as company
agent and has a wide range of authority,150 including bringing and de-
144 While directors do remain in office, their powers are greatly truncated. “While
a company is under administration, a person (other than the administrator) can-
not perform or exercise, and must not purport to perform or exercise, a function or
power as an officer . . . of the company,” except with the administrator’s written
approval. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 437C(1) (Austl.). Rather, the
director’s primary role becomes to assist the administrator. Directors are required
to aid the administrator by the delivery of the company books and provide state-
ments about the company’s business, property, affairs, and financial circum-
stances, as well as provide any other information the administrator reasonably
requires. See id. §§ 438B(1)–(3).
145 Compare id. § 437A(1) (“While a company is under administration, the admin-
istrator: (a) has control of the company’s business, property and affairs; and (b)
may carry on that business and manage that property and those affairs; and (c)
may terminate or dispose of all or part of that business, and may dispose of any of
that property; and (d) may perform any function, and exercise any power, that the
company or any of its officers could perform or exercise if the company were not
under administration.”), with 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (West 2012) (“Subject to any lim-
itations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter . . .. a debtor in posses-
sion shall have all the rights . . .. and powers, and shall perform all the functions
and duties . . .. of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.”).
146 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 437E.
147 As a general matter, any action on behalf of the company neither taken nor
approved by the administrator is void. See generally id. § 437D. There are, how-
ever, some exceptions relating to certain payments by banks. See id. § 437D(3).
148 See id. § 440D(1). Circumstances where a court will do so are rare. See, e.g.,
Foxcraft v. Ink Group Pty Ltd. [1994] 15 A.C.S.R. 203, 205 (“It may be that where
the company is insured against the liability the subject of the proceedings, the
administrator will ordinarily consent or the court will give conditional leave, but
outside this field it is hard to see situations where it would be proper to grant
leave, though doubtless there are such situations.”).
149 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 437F(1)(c) (“A transfer of shares in a
company that is made during the administration of the company is void except
if. . .(c) the Court makes an order under subsection (4) authorizing the transfer.”).
See id. §437F(8)(c) (“An alternation in the status of members of a company that is
made during the administration of the company is void except if: (c) the Court
makes an order under subsection (12) authorizing the alteration.”).
150 See id. § 437B.
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fending legal actions and executing documents.151 There are two note-
worthy exceptions to the Administrator’s power to bring legal action.
First, once a company is under administration, any guarantee of the
company’s liabilities, which has been given by a director of the firm or
a relative of a firm’s director, is not enforceable except by court or-
der.152 Second, potentially voidable transactions may not be chal-
lenged by an Administrator.153 Like his Examiner counterpart, an
Administrator may be personally liable for debts incurred under his or
her administration, including for goods bought and for property leased,
used, or occupied,154 though in both the Irish and Australian in-
stances, the Administrator is entitled to indemnification for such lia-
bility from the company’s assets.155
A primary power of the Administrator is to investigate. Shortly
following appointment, the Administrator is charged with calling two
meetings of creditors. The first meeting must be called within eight
business days of the commencement of the administration; its purpose
is to first, determine whether a committee of creditors should be ap-
pointed to aid the administration,156 and second, to determine who are
to be the committee’s members, with their primary functions to be con-
sultation regarding administrative matters and consideration of ad-
ministrative reports.157 A second meeting of creditors must be held
within 5 days of the convening period,158 generally within twenty days
of the commencement of the administration.159
Thus, within a month – by the time of the second meeting – the
Administrator will have examined the financial status of the ailing
company and will have reported to the firm’s creditors on both the fi-
151 See id. § 442A(c)-(d).
152 See id. § 440J(1).
153 However, such transactions may be challenged by a liquidator. Thus, the pres-
ence of such transactions may encourage creditors to vote for a liquidation rather
than for a deed of arrangement so that such transactions may be legally chal-
lenged. See Uncommercial Transactions, WORRELLS (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.
worrells.net.au/Content/InsolvencyResources/InsolvencyResourceArticle.aspx?Ar-
ticleId=71.
154 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 443A(1) (“The administrator of a company
under administration is liable for debts he or she incurs, in the performance or
exercise, or purported performance or exercise, of any of his or her functions and
powers as administrator, for: (a) services rendered; or (b) goods bought; or (c) prop-
erty hired, leased, used, or occupied . . . .”).
155 See id. § 443D.
156 See id. § 436E(1)–(2). It is worth noting that creditors cannot vote to end the
administration at this point.
157 See id. §§ 436E(1)(b), 436F(1).
158 See id. § 439A(2).
159 See id. § 439A(5)–(7). This period of time may be extended if the Court finds it
to be in the best interest of the creditors.
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nancial condition of the company160 and on the company’s potential
long-term viability.161 If he or she deems the company viable, the Ad-
ministrator will present the creditors with a deed of company arrange-
ment, on which the creditors will then vote.
The reorganization decision is made via a vote of the creditors
on the deed of company arrangement. A simple majority of creditors
voting is required based both on the number of creditors and on the
total dollar amount owed.162 Creditors are held to the task of conven-
ing a commission whereby they may undertake the decision as
whether to execute a deed of company arrangement, to end adminis-
tration, or to wind up the company.163 The deed binds virtually all par-
ties, including unsecured creditors, the company itself,164 the
company’s officers and members,165 and the deed’s Administrator.166
Secured creditors who have voted affirmatively are also bound by the
deed.167 Secured creditors who have voted to reject a deed which is
nonetheless confirmed by the majority are generally not bound by the
deed, however, and may generally enforce their rights in their collat-
eral as long as doing so will not result in a “materially adverse” impact
160 This includes investigating any past or present officer who may have commit-
ted misconduct or who may be otherwise accountable to the business. See id.
§ 439A.
161 In giving notice of this meeting, the administrator must accompany the notice
with the following:
(a) a report by the administrator about—
(i) the company’s business, property, affairs, and financial
circumstances; and
(ii) any other matter material to the creditors’ decisions to
be considered at the meeting; and
(b) a statement setting out the administrator’s opinion, about
each of the following matters:
(i) whether it would be in the creditors’ interests for the
company to execute a deed of company arrangement:
(ii) whether it would be in the creditors’ interests for the ad-
ministration to end:
(iii) whether it would be in the creditors’ interests for the
company to be placed in liquidation; and
(c) if a deed of company arrangement is proposed,a statement
setting out details of the proposed deed. Corporations Act
2001 (Cth) sub-reg 439A(4) (Austl.).
162 See Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth) reg 5.6.21(2) (Austl.).
163 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 439A-C (Austl.).
164 See id. § 444G(a).
165 See id. § 444G(b).
166 See id. § 444G(c).
167 See id. § 444D(1)–(2).
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on the purpose of the deed, and as long as the secured creditor is ade-
quately protected.168
Creditors may choose any of three options for the deed of com-
pany arrangement. First, the company may execute the deed of com-
pany arrangement specified in the resolution. As the deed is deemed to
be largely a vehicle for creditor satisfaction, there is wide latitude as to
what the deed may contain.169 Deeds of arrangement, however, must
meet certain proscribed conditions necessary to assure the ongoing op-
eration of the company.170 They must bind the company, its officers,
members,171 the deed’s administrator,172 and most of the company’s
creditors,173 and they must be implemented within 15 days, unless an
extension is obtained through a court.174 Second, the administration
168 See id. § 444F(3)(a).
169 Paul B. Lewis, Trouble Down Under: Some Thoughts on the Australian-Ameri-
can Corporate Bankruptcy Divide, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 189, n.69 (citing Phillip Lip-
ton, Voluntary Administration: Is there Life After Insolvency for the Unsecured
Creditor?, 1 INSOLVENCY L.J. 87, 92 (1993)) (“As one commentator put it: “It is
hoped that the procedure will allow for considerable flexibility in order to enable
the contents of the deed to meet the needs and circumstances of the company and
its various creditors. The deed may provide for debts to be compromised or repay-
ments delayed or paid in installments.”).
170 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 444A(4) (Austl.).
(“The [deed] must specify the following:
(a) the administrator of the deed;
(b) the property of the company (whether or not already owned
by the company when it executes the deed)  that is to be
available to pay creditors’ claims;
(c) the nature and duration of any moratorium period for which
the deed provides;
(d) to what extent the company is to be released from its debts;
(e) the conditions (if any) for the deed to come into operation;
(f) the conditions (if any) for the deed to continue in operation;
(g) the circumstances in which the deed terminates;
(h) the order in which proceeds of realising the property referred
to in paragraph (b) are to be distributed among creditors
bound by the deed;
(i) the day (not later than the day when the administration be-
gan) on or before which claims must have arisen if they are to
be admissible under the deed.”)
171 See id. § 444G.
172 See id.
173 See id. §§ 444D(1)–(2). It is however, possible to terminate the deed. An admin-
istrator may do so when it is no longer practicable to carry on the business. Under
such circumstances, a creditors’ meeting may be called to decide whether the com-
pany should be voluntarily wound up. See id. § 445C-F.
174 See id. § 444B(2).
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may end. If the administration is terminated,175 the company reverts
to its former position, subjecting the company once again to the pros-
pect of receivership or liquidation. The third and final option is for the
company to wind up.176 In this case, the company is deemed to have
wound up voluntarily.177
B. American Chapter 11
American insolvency law is designed with an emphasis on res-
cuing troubled firms to preserve the social and economic benefits that
attend the existence of a successful business. A balancing of the com-
peting interests is a distinctly lower level priority than in Ireland.178
Under Chapter 11, it is the norm for the debtor to remain controlled by
the existing management post-bankruptcy filing.179 The existing man-
agement then operates as the “debtor in possession.”180 With the
debtor in possession in charge – rather than an independent party, as
is the case in Ireland and Australia – an incentive is created to seek
Chapter 11 relief early when the company’s prospects of ongoing via-
bility may be greater. The debtor in possession can operate both with-
out the constraints of a trustee and largely unfettered by creditors, so
long as it is functioning within the boundaries of the ordinary course of
business.181
A few general aspects of Chapter 11 are worth briefly noting.
First, there is no insolvency requirement – either on a balance sheet or
an equity basis – to file for Chapter 11.182 Second, as is the case in
175 See id. §§ 435C(3)(a)-(h) (The administration typically ends for one of these
three reasons; however, procedural matters, such as failure to hold the meeting,
may bring about an end to the administration as well.).
176 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 439C(c) (Austl.).
177 See id. § 491(1).
178 Reorganization is seen as preferable to liquidation in the United States. See
e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (quoting H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787) (“By permit-
ting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to pro-
vide jobs, to satisfy creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners.
Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in
a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap’.”) (internal citations omitted).
179 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (West 2012).
180 Sometimes abbreviated as DIP. It is possible in unusual cases in Chapter 11 to
have a trustee or examiner appointed. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (West 2012). However,
the debtor operating as debtor in possession is the norm.
181 As long as the debtor is operating within the ordinary course of its business,
the debtor in possession fully operates the business during the time the company
is in Chapter 11. It has the right, subject to certain restrictions, to use, sell, or
lease the property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (West 2012).
182 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (West 2012).
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Ireland and Australia, the filing of a Chapter 11 petition creates a
moratorium – known as the automatic stay – on all collection efforts on
pre-bankruptcy filing obligations.183 Unlike the situation in Australia,
however, the automatic stay generally binds secured creditors subject
to certain exceptions.184 Third, the debtor in possession is given the
exclusive right to propose a plan185 for the first 120 days following the
filing of a petition,186 a period which may be extended further for
cause.187 This “exclusivity period” provides certain leverage to the
debtor in possession in negotiating a Chapter 11 reorganization
plan.188 If neither the debtor’s plan nor any other plan can be success-
fully confirmed, the firm’s assets will likely be liquidated.189
The Bankruptcy Code imposes multiple requirements for a
plan to be confirmed.190 All are mandatory, except one – that the plan
be consensual.191 Creditors vote on a plan by class.192 A favorable vote
can be obtained in either of two ways. Any class of claimants whose
interests are unimpaired193 under the plan is automatically deemed to
accept the plan.194 Alternatively, an impaired class may vote in favor
of a plan. To do so, both the majority of creditors in the class must vote
in favor of the plan, and the claims of those voting for the plan must
183 Id. § 362; accord Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sub-reg 440 (Austl.).
184 The primary exceptions are that the creditor may have the stay lifted or modi-
fied if there is no equity in the property and the property is not needed for an
effective reorganization, or if there is an absence of adequate protection of the se-
cured creditor’s secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d)(1)-(2) (West 2012).
185 A plan proponent must also provide, in addition to the plan, a court approved
disclosure statement containing adequate information for a creditor to evaluate
the plan. Id. § 1125 (West 2012).
186 See id. § 1121(b). This is called the exclusivity period. If the debtor has not
filed a plan within 120 days, or if the plan has not been confirmed within 180 days,
any party may file its own plan. Id. § 1121(c).
187 See id. § 1121(d).
188 The desire to give the debtor leverage to negotiate is made clear in the legisla-
tive history of the Code. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 64 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5850.
189 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (West 2012) (providing for conversion of a case
from Chapter 11 to one under Chapter 7 of the Code).
190 See id. § 1129(a).
191 See id. § 1129(a)(8).
192 All holders of claims and interests may vote on the plan. See id. § 1126(a) (“The
holder of a claim or interest allowed under section 502 of this title may accept or
reject a plan.”). See generally id. § 1122.
193 A class is said to be impaired unless certain specified requirements are met
which essentially leave unaltered the rights of the party in question. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1124.
194 See id. § 1124, 1126(f).
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have a dollar value equal to at least 2/3 of the dollar value of all of the
claims in the class.195
As long as the plan is consensual, the debtor’s ability to retain
ownership is determined contractually based upon the agreement of
the parties rather than the rule of law. If the plan is not consensual,
however, and an impaired class rejects the plan, the court can still
confirm the plan in what is known as a “cram down” if certain require-
ments are met.196 These requirements include, among other things,
that at least one class of impaired creditors who are not insiders has
accepted the plan,197 that the plan does not discriminate unfairly,198
that the “best interests test” is satisfied,199 and that the plan is
deemed “fair and equitable.”200
The “fair and equitable” requirement may be satisfied in differ-
ent ways depending upon the status of the creditor. For dissenting se-
cured creditors, a plan is fair and equitable and can be crammed down
if the secured creditor effectively receives the full economic equivalent
of its secured claim.201 The U.S. Code provides three alternative meth-
ods of accomplishing this. First, a dissenting secured creditor may
keep its lien and receive payments on the plan’s effective date equal to
the amount of the secured claim.202 Second, the creditor may receive
the indubitable equivalent of its claim.203 Third, the property can be
sold free and clear of the lien, with the creditor’s security interest at-
taching to the proceeds of the sale; this lien on proceeds may then be
treated under either of the other two options.204
For impaired, dissenting unsecured creditors, a plan is deemed
fair and equitable if it satisfies the terms of the Absolute Priority Rule.
The Absolute Priority Rule follows the principle that since creditors
have priority over equity in contracts under state law, it is appropriate
that, absent an agreement to the contrary, the priority order be main-
tained in a reorganization.205 Hence, this signaled  the derivation of
the Absolute Priority Rule, which holds that no junior class of claim-
ants can receive a penny in a cram down unless all senior classes are
195 See id. § 1126(c).
196 See id. § 1129(b).
197 See id. § 1129(a)(10).
198 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)
199 The best interest test requires the dissenting impaired class of creditors to
receive at least as much as it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See id. § 1129(a)(7).
200 See id. § 1129(b)(1).
201 See id. § 1129(b)(2).
202 See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A).
203 See id.
204 Id.
205 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502–05 (1913).
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paid in full.206 Thus, a plan is fair and equitable with respect to an
impaired class if that class will receive full compensation for its al-
lowed claims before any junior class receives any distributions.
A significant issue in relation to the Absolute Priority Rule is
the existence of the so-called “new value exception.” The exception, im-
plicitly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bank of America Na-
tional Trust and Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street
Partnership,207 has the effect of allowing the existing shareholders of a
Chapter 11 debtor to retain ownership notwithstanding their inability
to satisfy the Absolute Priority Rule, so long as they contribute new,
necessary capital in a full value, market transaction in which they pay
top dollar for the right to retain ownership. As will be discussed below,
the Irish courts are currently considering a related issue with respect
to Examinership. When confirmed, the court will implement a Chapter
11 plan, which will replace old debts with new debts so the company
emerges as a reorganized entity not likely to need further economic
restructuring.
C. Examinership vs. Voluntary Administration and Chapter 11
The Irish examinership approach to business restructuring ap-
pears to be a genuine effort to balance the competing interests of all
relevant parties to the restructuring. It reflects a moderate intermedi-
ate compromise between the two more extreme approaches to business
insolvency considered in this article. This compromise manifests itself
in a number of different ways. For example, in Ireland, entry into ex-
aminership requires some independent determination of its necessity
and its prospect of ultimate success. A report of independent account-
ant is required, and under section 2(2) of the Companies Act as
amended, a Court “shall not make an order . . . unless it is satisfied
that there is a reasonable prospect of the survival of the company and
206 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B), which provides:
— For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be
fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the following
requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims -
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class
receive or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as
of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of
such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the
claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan on
account of such junior claim or interest any property. . .
207 Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S.
434 (1999).
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the whole or any part of its undertaking as a going concern.”208 In the
United States, neither a showing of insolvency nor a showing that
Chapter 11 may ultimately be effective is required.209 As a result, in
the United States, any entity, solvent or insolvent, with or without re-
alistic chances of reorganization, may be a debtor in bankruptcy.210
Not surprisingly, this has given rise in the United States to strategic
use of insolvency as something akin to a business-planning device. In-
solvency law can be used to obtain otherwise unavailable delays, to
reject executory contracts and to get out from under unfavorable labor
agreements,211 as well as for other strategic purposes.
Similarly, voting for an Irish scheme – like an Australian deed
of arrangement – is based on a simple majority of creditors both by
number and by dollar amount at stake. Claims are not classified. By
contrast, the American voting system relies on the classification of a
claim,212 and there is a super-majority component required for a class
to consent to a plan. As noted, in the U.S., unless a class is
unimpaired, for it to vote in favor of a plan, the majority of creditors in
the class must vote in favor of the plan, and their claims must have a
value equal to at least two-thirds of the value of all of the claims in the
class; yet, a compelling argument exists that super-majority voting is
appropriate only where there is a fear that corporate decisions will, by
their nature, affect majority and minority shareholders differently,
such as is the case with a closely held corporation.213 This is not true
in Chapter 11, since each class member will receive a proportionate
share of the distribution. While the benefits of a super-majority
scheme in Chapter 11 are nominal, the costs are not. Further, the Irish
approach mirrors non-bankruptcy corporate voting which, as a general
matter, provides for a one vote per share approach.214 Such an ap-
proach reflects the fact that each vote should correlate with the finan-
cial stake of the voter in the firm. Similarly, by employing simple
208 Companies (Amendment) (No. 2) Act of 1999, supra note 79, § 2(2) (Ir.), availa-
ble at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1999/en/act/pub/0030/index.html.
209 11 U.S.C. § 301 (West 2012).
210 See id.
211 For example, the United Airlines bankruptcy.
212 Note that this is not by the creditor’s classification. A single creditor may have
more than one claim. The classic example is an undersecured creditor, who has a
secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the
remainder. This creditor will vote both its secured and its unsecured claim.
213 See generally, David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Vot-
ing in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 515–16 (1992).
214 E.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2002). However, corporations can gener-
ally alter this one vote per share model should they so choose. For an overview of
corporate voting rules, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & ECON. 395, 399 (1983).
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majority voting, Examinership ensures that the vote will necessarily
correlate with the financial stake of the voter, and takes into account
the rights of small creditors who may be the most adversely affected by
the bankruptcy, and whose interests may be contrary to those with the
greatest value at stake.
Third, Ireland has no direct counterpart to the American
debtor in possession.215 Instead, an Irish Examiner has substantial,
though not complete, control of the debtor entity. Not only does this in
part remove management from the decision making process, which
may have induced an endogenously caused insolvency,216 it tends to
avoid the moral hazard issues which arise from the debtor in posses-
sion law. A debtor in possession may be tempted to opt for high-risk
strategies on the basis that it has nothing left to lose by doing so but
potentially a substantial amount to gain. This strategy – surely tempt-
ing to the debtor in possession of any insolvent company – contains
moral hazards analogous to those commonly associated with limited
liability. As equity investors lose their investment before debt inves-
tors do, the equity holder (in charge as debtor in possession) has noth-
ing left to lose and, thus, does not bear the full burden of its risky
behavior. As a result, an incentive is created for the equity holders to
direct a firm to behave in an excessively risky fashion. Further, the
Irish approach avoids the inherent conflict in fiduciary obligations
that exist in the United States. A debtor in possession, with all the
rights and powers of a trustee in most instances, is responsible during
the bankruptcy for, among other things, operating the business, as-
suming and rejecting executory contracts, and proposing a plan of re-
215 Interestingly, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
created by Congress in 1970 to examine the existing bankruptcy laws, proposed
that a trustee be appointed for any corporate bankruptcy case involving 300 or
more security holders and debts of at least $1,000,000, unless a trustee was found
to be unnecessary or the expense would be “disproportionate to the protection af-
forded.” H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 221 (1973). As noted, however, when Chapter 11
was ultimately enacted, the debtor acting as debtor in possession was the estab-
lished norm, and a trustee could only be appointed “for cause, including fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by
current management. . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (West 2012).
216 Perhaps most notably in recent years, Bradley and Rosenzweig have argued
that this is a common occurrence. “More fundamentally, fashioning a firm’s capital
structure obviously involves certain choices regarding the use of debt financing. To
the extent that managers, influenced by the availability of bankruptcy protection,
choose to burden their firms with ‘too much’ debt or ‘impossible’ debt-payment obli-
gations, financial distress is hardly an entirely exogenous event. On this view,
corporate bankruptcy frequently is significantly endogenous, chosen by, rather
than imposed upon, corporate managers.” Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig,
The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1047 (1992).
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organization.217 By doing so, it makes numerous decisions that impact
the value and viability of the business. These decisions will harm some
parties and benefit others. Yet a debtor in possession simultaneously
owes fiduciary obligations to a number of parties including creditors,
officers, directors, and equity, whose interests rarely align.218
Fourth, there are obvious benefits to quickly resolving the fi-
nancial issues of the company. In Ireland, the entire process is typi-
cally concluded within 70 days, and it must be concluded within 100
days at the most.219 The speed of these processes results in several key
benefits, including lower administrative costs and a smaller delay for
investors hoping to reinvest their assets.
The related issues of the existence of creditor control and the
presence of cram down provisions are core questions for any corporate
rescue scheme. Insolvent firms are effectively owned by their credi-
tors.220 In situations of insolvency, creditors, who primarily bear the
burden of further loss, should be given decision-making discretion.
Irish law limits the powers of secured creditors by requiring secured
creditor participation in the Examinership. While this binds all rele-
vant parties by the process, it does create issues for secured creditors
in that their rights are determined in part by those who bear no direct
risk. As noted, however, these risks are ameliorated to a degree by the
217 See 11 U.S.C. § 363.
218 For a thorough discussion of the conflict of interest problem, see Raymond T.
Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Du-
ties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 2 (1989).
219 Companies (Amendment) (No. 2), supra note 79, § 22.
220 See Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351,
1360 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Creditors effectively own bankrupt firms.”). In fact, the fidu-
ciary duty of a firm’s directors shifts upon insolvency from the firm’s shareholders
to its creditors. See In re Mortgageamerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Cir.
1983) (“Becoming insolvent, the equitable interest of the stockholders in the prop-
erty, together with their conditional liability to the creditors, places the property
in a condition of trust, for the creditors, and then for the stockholders.”) (quoting
Hollins v. Briefield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 383 (1893)); Clarkson Co., Ltd v.
Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990 (1982) (“If the
corporation was insolvent at that time it is clear that defendants, as officers and
directors thereof, were to be considered as though trustees of the property for the
corporate-beneficiaries [creditors].”) (quoting New York Credit Men’s Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y., 1953)); Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12510, 1991 WL 277613, at
*34 (Del. 1991) (“At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insol-
vency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but
owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”); FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973,
976–77 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983) (“[W]hen the corporation
becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders
to the creditors.”).
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fact that there is precedent suggesting that secured creditors cannot
be forced over their objection to accept less than the value of their se-
curity in settlement of a debt.221 Such a protection should presumably
help preserve the availability of credit at an appropriate cost in the
future.
The second aspect of creditor control is the existence of cram
down, or the allowance of confirmation of non-consensual plans of reor-
ganization. In Ireland, a court can confirm a plan if the court is satis-
fied that the proposals are fair and equitable in relation to any class of
creditors that has not accepted the proposals and whose interests
would be impaired by them, and if the court is satisfied that the pro-
posals are not unfairly prejudicial to any interested parties. Therefore,
Irish law provides some protections for both dissenting secured and
unsecured creditors as a balance to the rights of the equity holders.
IV. THE DEBT CRISIS AND EXAMINERSHIP IN IRELAND
The number of Examinership cases that have been filed in Ire-
land in recent years is stunningly small. There has been some signifi-
cant increase in filings from boom to bust years by percentage, with
the numbers of petitions rising by a factor of five, but this is somewhat
misleading given the extremely small numbers involved. From 2006 –
2010, the numbers were as follows:222
2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 (@ 31 July)
Petitions
Presented 8 24 41 40 11
Interim
Examiners 4 20 33 33 8
Examiners 4 22 39 40 9
Schemes
Approved 6 17 27 32 6
The question for this paper is why such a seemingly moderate, sensi-
ble approach to corporate rescue has been virtually ignored through-
221 E.g., Re Sharmand Ltd., [2008] 514 COS (where the secured creditor argued
successfully that there is no precedent for the involuntary writing down of secured
debt in an Examinership).
222 The Honourable Mr. Justice Franke Clarke, Court Supervised Corporate Re-
covery in Ireland: Recent Developments in the Use of the Examinership Provisions,
presented at the Annual General Meeting and Conference of the International As-
sociation of Insolvency Regulators at Dublin Castle, Ireland (Sept. 22, 2010).
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out one of the worst economic periods in the history of the Republic of
Ireland.
To begin with, the general economic environment in a country
is likely to be a significant element in the success or failure of any
corporate rescue scheme. In Ireland, the boom at the end of the twenti-
eth century and into the early part of the twenty-first century was fol-
lowed by a monumental bust. The problems leading to the need for
recovery and the issues facing any possible solution must be consid-
ered against that backdrop.
There are several possible explanations for the overall small
numbers of Examinership filings. One explanation may be that ex-
aminership is not well suited to deal with economic failures related to
real property and its construction, industries responsible, along with
the banking industry, for much of the economic ills by which Ireland
has been bedeviled over the past few years. A second possible explana-
tion is that once the economic environment in a country reaches a cer-
tain depressed point, corporate rescue ceases to be a viable option.
This may be particularly true when the recession hits the nation’s
banks as deeply as was the case in Ireland, as the necessary funds for
post-Examinership success – either through debt financing or through
equity financing – were not available. A third, related possibility is
that the restructuring process may create a deterrent to its application
if the process leaves companies post-Examinership ill-equipped for
long-term success. Unfortunately, there is no data available in Ireland
as to the survival rate of companies post-Examinership.223
Beginning with property and construction companies – indus-
tries at the center of Ireland’s economic problems – in reviewing pro-
posals related to the Examinership of companies in such industries,
courts have recently either declined to appoint an examiner or have
refused to approve the scheme of arrangement proffered.224 While the
Examinership process is applied uniformly irrespective of the nature
of the company’s business, some critics have argued that aspects of the
construction business may make the Examinership process more diffi-
cult for companies in that industry as compared to other industries.225
The devastation of the real property sector in Ireland during
the past few years has been exhaustively documented. The majority of
property in Ireland has declined significantly in value during this
time, with perhaps the majority of property falling in value by fifty
223 Id. at 4.3.
224 See, e.g., Re Vantive Holdings, supra note 92, at 384; Re Laragan Dev. [2009]
I.E.H.C. 390; Re Tivway [2010] I.E.S.C. 11.
225 See Clarke, supra note 222, at 8.1–8.7.
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percent or more.226 The result has been devastating for companies in
the business of construction and property development in Ireland.
These companies have experienced financial difficulties at a rate ex-
ceeding any other sector of the Irish economy.
The Honourable Justice Frank Clarke, in a paper entitled
“Court Supervised Corporate Recovery in Ireland: Recent Develop-
ments in the Use of the Examinership Provisions,”227 noted a number
of issues that have impacted the effective use of the Examinership pro-
visions in Ireland in recent years. These issues include the following:
• Due to the massive losses suffered in the real estate and con-
struction businesses, companies in those industries are
likely to have exceptionally severe financial problems com-
pared to an ordinary company seeking restructuring by
Examinership.
• Further complicating the situation for such companies is the
fact that virtually all of their property of value is likely to be
subject to liens, and the holders of such liens may well prefer
to have a Receiver appointed and realize on their security
rather than try to salvage the existing company.
• A related issue arises for companies required under their
lease agreements to pay rental amounts well above market
value. As lease prices have fallen with property value, it
would clearly be advantageous for companies in such circum-
stances to be able to get out from under such leases. As noted
previously, Examinership allows for the repudiation of
leases, but only under limited circumstances and with court
consent.228 While it has not historically been an uncommon
occurrence for landlords to negotiate down the amount of
rent in difficult financial times, this has been complicated by
the fact that many landlords borrowed heavily themselves to
finance the purchases of their properties, and may as a re-
sult may not be in an economically viable position to renego-
tiate a decrease in rent. In addition, if there are guarantees
by shareholders or principals of the debtor-lessor, the incen-
tives for the lessee to reduce rental amounts are likely to be
substantially lessened.
• In a number of recent cases, the company’s primary lender
has opposed Examinership. While in many cases the com-
pany does have the support of its lender – perhaps because
226 Ronan Lyons, Taking Stock of Ireland’s Property Market, Five Years into the
Crash, DAFT.IE (2012), available at http://www.daft.ie/report/Daft-House-Price-Re-
port-Q2-2012.pdf.
227 Clarke, supra note 222, at 16.
228 Re Linen Supply of Ireland Ltd., [2009] I.E.H.C. 544 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).
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the undersecured lender sees an Examinership as creating
the greatest likelihood of recovering lost value – cases deal-
ing with real property tend to involve scenarios where the
bank may prefer a Receivership to an Examinership. This
leads to a core question in Ireland – namely, whether a
debtor requiring ongoing financing can successfully establish
a scheme of arrangement without the consent of its banks.
Among the possible issues for consideration is whether a
scheme can force the lender to accept adjusted and less
favorable lending terms than that to which they originally
agreed. The second question is whether the prohibition on a
scheme being “unfairly prejudicial” precludes forcing a se-
cured lender to accept a decreased payment than that to
which they would otherwise be entitled.229 These remain key
issues to resolve under Irish Examinership law.230
229 Clarke, supra note 222, at 11.3.
230 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (West 2012). Recall that in the United
States, a plan can be confirmed over the consent of the secured claim in effect so
long as the secured creditor receives the economic equivalent of its secured claim,
which will equal the value of the collateral – not the value of the entire debt – if
the creditor is under-secured. See § 1129(b)(2)(A), which reads in relevant part:
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan
be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the fol-
lowing requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan pro-
vides—
(i) (I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens
securing such claims, whether the property
subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or
transferred to another entity, to the extent of
the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive
on account of such claim deferred cash pay-
ments totaling at least the allowed amount of
such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s
interest in the estate’s interest in such
property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of
any property that is subject to the liens securing
such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such
liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the
treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i)
or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable
equivalent of such claims.
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• A general question of fairness has arisen in regard to
schemes of arrangement where the only investors
forthcoming are the existing shareholders of the com-
pany. While there is no legal prohibition to this in Ire-
land, it may create a situation where shareholders are
allowed to retain ownership of the company notwith-
standing the fact that creditors are not being fully re-
paid what they are owed. As Justice Clarke puts it:
Where the investor is an independent third party,
then it is difficult to second-guess that investor’s com-
mercial judgment of what the company may be worth
when it comes out of examinership. Examiners nor-
mally advertise in an appropriate way for investors.
Examiners will opt for the best investment package if
there be more than one. If there is no other investor
willing to put forward a better package, then it is diffi-
cult to avoid the conclusion that the package on offer
represents a legitimate commercial valuation of the
company. However, where the investor is, in sub-
stance, already in control of the company, and where
that person or those persons will retain such control,
then it seems to the courts that a greater degree of
scrutiny needs to be applied to ensure that the inves-
tors are not simply using examinership as a means of
writing off their debts and, possibly, avoiding any ad-
ditional scrutiny that might arise in the context of liq-
uidation. While no scheme of arrangement has yet
been refused on such grounds, it is an issue which has
arisen in a number of cases and may well require a
definitive court ruling in due course. In such cases,
fairness as between shareholders and creditors needs
to be considered, in addition to fairness between differ-
ent categories of creditor.”231
As noted above, a similar issue was litigated in the United
States in regard to the so-called new value exception (or corollary) to
the absolute priority rule, and was ultimately resolved by the United
States Supreme Court in Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Association v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, where the Court im-
plicitly allowed such a restructuring plan so long as the new equity
was purchased at top dollar.232 There are a number of policy justifica-
tions for allowing old ownership to bid to purchase the equity of the
new company even when creditors are not paid in full, so long as the
231 See Clarke, supra note 222, at 11.3.
232 Bank of Am. Nat’l. Trust and Sav. Ass’n, supra note 207.
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old ownership will pay more than any other willing buyer. These policy
reasons include the basic concept that more bidders generally results
in better auctions.233 The more interested bidders, the greater the
price the auction is likely to return, which in turn means more funds
will be available for distribution to creditors.
Further, a rational equity holder may bid more than a rational
third party creditor or a third party buyer. This is the case for a num-
ber of reasons. First, equity holders are already familiar with the busi-
ness and are thus less likely to discount their bids for unknown
risks.234 Other motivations may include family name and identity as-
sociated with the business or embarrassment over failure to pay credi-
tors. Second, the equity holders may also have personal liability, such
as guaranties, linked to the continuation of the business, or personal
income opportunities, such as employment compensation or manage-
ment fees. Finally, an additional justification for desiring the availa-
bility of new value plans may be to increase the likelihood that the
business may successfully reorganize rather than be liquidated.235 The
reorganization process may be viewed as more than a collective pro-
ceeding for the enforcement of rights held by creditors under state law.
Rather, liquidations may have a negative impact on jobs, suppliers to
businesses, and the economy as a whole. The ability of shareholders to
remain in control and rehabilitate the business encourages reorganiza-
tion instead of liquidation.
So why haven’t there been more Examinerships during the
Irish debt crisis? Clearly, there is a combination of contributing fac-
tors. First, to succeed, reorganizations must generally commence
before the distressed entity is financially hopeless. Too many Irish
housing and construction companies effectively reached the point of no
return before any reorganization had commenced. Second, restructur-
ing requires post-insolvency financing, and the credit crunch made the
prospect of obtaining available financing a remote one for many busi-
nesses. One of the issues impacting the credit crunch in Ireland has
been that restrictions on lending were imposed in order to improve the
loan-to-deposit rations of Irish banks. A second is that bank managers
– particularly those whose financial success is dependent upon staying
in charge rather than based on an equity share of profits - may have
sensed greatly increased incentives to be risk averse in their lending,
particularly if their bank’s capital is low.
Finally, distressed firms need to be restructured in decisive
fashion, not merely kept alive. This has been shown to be particularly
233 See generally Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, 3 STAN. J.
L. BUS. & FIN. 125 (1997).
234 See id. at 148–51.
235 Id. at 130.
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true in dealing with property-based companies.236 Thus, in addition to
salvaging the banks by guaranteeing their obligations, more attention
should have been paid to ensuring some degree of financial solidity of
the building and construction companies most heavily hit during the
debt crisis.
V. CONCLUSION
The Irish economy continues to struggle with the effects of an
ongoing debt crisis that crippled its banks, caused the government to
undertake massive guarantees of bank obligations, and saw the most
vulnerable businesses – those in the housing and construction sector –
fail at an alarming rate. The presence of a well-thought-out, but little
utilized, corporate restructuring law did virtually nothing to amelio-
rate the effects on distressed businesses. Successful corporate restruc-
turing is dependent upon more than just a sound law. Overall
economic conditions, including the presence of a stable banking sys-
tem, are a necessary prerequisite to the success of any scheme of dis-
tressed company restructuring.
236 See, e.g., ALAN AHEARNE & NAOKI SHINADA, ZOMBIE FIRMS AND ECONOMIC
STAGNATION IN JAPAN 4, 16–17 (2005), available at http://hi-stat.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
research/discussion/2005/pdf/D05-95.pdf;  Gerard Caprio & Patrick Honohan,
Starting Over Safely: Rebuilding Banking Systems, in FINANCIAL CRISES: LESSONS
FROM THE PAST, PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 217–55 (Gerard Caprio, et al. eds.,
Brookings Inst. Press 2005).
